The merits of expanding or restricting access to consumer credit are hotly debated. I examine some effects of restricting access, using household survey data on payday loan users collected around a policy change that imposed binding restrictions on loan terms in Oregon but not in Washington. The results suggest that the policy change decreased short-term borrowing in Oregon relative to Washington, with many Oregon payday borrowers shifting into plausibly inferior substitutes. Oregon respondents were also significantly more likely to experience an adverse change in financial condition. The results suggest that restricting access to consumer credit hinders productive investment and/or consumption smoothing, at least over the short-term.
I. Introduction
The merits of expanding or restricting access to consumer credit are hotly debated. The worldwide use of microcredit to fight poverty by expanding credit access typically focuses on financing "productive" microentrepreneurship rather than "unproductive consumption". Recent work on intertemporal choice suggests that usury ceilings may actually improve market efficiency. Interest rate caps (and borrowing restrictions more generally) can improve welfare if consumers have behavioral biases that induce overborrowing. 4 Incomplete insurance markets can also motivate rate ceilings even in the absence of behavioral biases.
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My paper does not test competing theories of intertemporal choice but rather adds to the related literature providing reduced-form evidence on the effects of access to expensive credit.
Several prior studies find that, on average, expensive consumer loans help borrowers smooth negative shocks (Morse 2007; Wilson et al. 2008) , make productive investments in job retention (Karlan and Zinman 2008) , or better manage liquidity to alleviate financial distress (Morgan and Strain 2008) . Several other studies find that increased access to expensive credit increases financial distress (Melzer 2007; Campbell et al. 2008; Skiba and Tobacman 2008a) and/or poor job performance (Carrell and Zinman 2008) .
1 See Karlan and Zinman (2008) for a discussion. 2 Payday loans typically extend a few hundred dollars in return for a check post-dated to borrower's next pay date in the amount of the loan principal + a finance charge of at least $15 per $100. See Section II for details on the product and the market. 3 http://www.barackobama.com/issues/economy/. To my knowledge Presidential candidate John McCain has not formalized a position on payday loans as of this writing. 4 Behavioral biases may produce borrowing that is excessive relative to a normative benchmark, working through preferences (Skiba and Tobacman 2008b) , cost perceptions (Stango and Zinman 2008) , and/or expectations (Brunnermeier and Parker 2005; Browning and Tobacman 2007) . 5 Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998) provide theory and evidence supporting this view. Benmelech and Moskowitz (2008) study the adoption of U.S. state usury laws in the 19 th century and find that they are motivated by rent-seeking, not efficiency considerations.
I examine the effects of restricting access to expensive consumer credit using household survey data 6 collected around new binding restrictions imposed by the state of Oregon in 2007
(the "Cap", below). The neighboring state of Washington considered enacting a similar restrictions but did not. Before-and after-Cap panel data, on a sample of Oregon and Washington respondents who were payday borrowers before-Cap, motivates difference-in-differences (DD) estimates of the effects of the cap (and of access to expensive credit more generally) on borrower choices and outcomes. Several issues complicate the estimation. Dissimilarities across treatment (Oregon) and control (Washington) groups in baseline characteristics and attrition motivate matching and weighting estimators in addition to simple means comparisons. The short-run follow-up period (5 months) and trend in lender exit motivate attempts to identify Oregon respondents who were most affected (i.e., most likely rationed) by the Cap. Overall the results are qualitatively robust to various DD estimation strategies.
I find that the Cap dramatically reduced access to payday loans in Oregon, and that former payday borrowers responded by shifting into incomplete and plausibly inferior substitutes. Most substitution seems to occur through checking account overdrafts of various types and/or late bills.
These alternative sources of liquidity can be quite costly in both direct terms (overdraft and late fees) and indirect terms (loss of checking account, criminal charges, utility shutoff). Under the broadest measure of liquidity in the data the likelihood of any expensive short-term borrowing fell by 9 percentage points in Oregon relative to Washington following the Cap. This jibes with perceptions, elicited in the baseline survey, that close substitutes for payday loans are lacking.
Next I examine the effects of the Cap on the summary measures of financial condition that are available in the data: employment status, and respondents' qualitative assessments of recent and future financial situations. 7 Estimates on individual outcomes are noisy but consistent with large declines in financial condition. Estimates on a summary measure of any adverse outcomebeing unemployed, experiencing a recent decline in financial condition, or expecting a future decline in financial condition-suggest large and significant deterioration in the financial condition of Oregon respondents relative to their Washington counterparts. 8 As such the results suggest that restricting access to consumer credit hinders productive investment and/or consumption smoothing, at least over the short-term. 6 The survey was funded by the Consumer Credit Research Foundation, which itself is funded by payday loan industry sources. Please see Section IV for more details on survey design and data collection. 7 Karlan and Zinman (2008) find that treatment effects on quantitative and qualitative measures of household well-being are positively correlated; see Section VI for more details. See Kahneman and Krueger (2006) for a more general discussion of subjective well-being measures and their uses. 8 The impact studies cited above also find evidence consistent with large treatment-on-the-treated effects.
The paper proceeds with a brief overview of the payday loan market. Section III then details the Oregon policy change and subsequent lender exit. Section IV describes the sample frame and survey data. Section V details my approaches to estimating treatment effects and related threats to identification. Section VI presents the main results: estimates of the five-month impacts of the Cap on credit access, credit use, and financial condition. Section VII discusses how and why longer-run impacts might differ, and presents results using predicted-rationed Oregon respondents as the treatment group, and Washington payday borrowers in the follow-up period as the control group. Section VIII concludes with a brief discussion of directions for future research.
II. The Payday Loan Market: Some Background
In a standard payday loan contract the lender advances the borrower $100-$300 9 in return for a post-dated check, dated to coincide with the borrower's next paycheck, in the amount of $115-$345. The market rate is about $15 per $100 advanced (390% APR for a 2-week loan), although fees as high as $30 per $100 are not uncommon. 10 Nearly all transactions are face-to-face in retail outlets, although internet lending is growing.
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Payday lending has grown explosively in the U.S. since the early 1990s and is now prevalent.
The market barely existed in the early 1990s; there are now over 20,000 lending outlets (Stephens Inc. 2007) . 12 As others have noted, this means that there are now more payday lending outlets in the U.S. than McDonalds' and Starbucks combined. 13 Micro data on payday borrowers is limited, but the available evidence suggests that perhaps 5 to 7 percent of the U.S. population has used a payday loan, with very prevalent serial borrowing (Tanik 2005; Stegman 2007 ). Many (potential) payday borrowers are served by social welfare programs like Food Stamps and the Earned Income Tax Credit, and annual payday loan volume of $40-$50 billion now exceeds the annual amount transferred by these programs. 14 The potential payday market comprises perhaps 10% of U.S. households (Stephens Inc. 2007 ). Payday borrowers must have documented steady employment and a checking account. They generally face severe credit constraints, and have poor 9 Stegman (2007) estimates that 80% of payday loans are for $300 or less, and much of the information in this section draws on his overview of the industry. See also Barr (2004) and Caskey (1994; The closest substitute for a payday loan is arguably overdraft protection on a bank account (Stegman 2007; Morgan and Strain 2008) . 16 Other expensive loan products require collateral (pawn, auto title, subprime home equity), a durable purchase (rent-to-own), or are available only once a year (tax refund anticipation).
Section IV will describe some baseline characteristics and borrowing behavior for my sample of payday borrowers. First I present some details on the Oregon Cap.
III. The Oregon Policy Change and Lender Exit
The Oregon policy change (the "Cap" hereafter) constrained the set of permissible terms on consumer loans under $50,000. 15 None of the studies cited in the Introduction has national data on borrowing or extensive detail on borrower characteristics; the evidence cited above comes from Stegman's review of descriptive studies of payday borrowers. See also Brown and Cushman (2006) . 16 Bouncing checks is quite costly due to insufficient funds and return check fees, the potential for criminal charges, and negative effects on the credit score (CheckSys) banks use to screen applicants for a deposit account (Campbell et al. 2008) . With overdraft protection a bank pays overdrawn checks rather than returning them. In exchange the bank often charges the account holder a $20 to $30 fee. Hence in many cases getting a payday loan is cheaper than overdrawing the checking account (particularly if the account holder runs the risk of overdrawing multiple checks). 17 The DFCS licenses and supervises payday lenders, responding to consumer complaints and conducting routine examinations of licensees at least every two years. The DFCS has taken several enforcement actions against payday lenders in the past; see, e.g. 
A. Sample Frame and Resulting Samples
The baseline ("before" Cap) surveys were conducted between June 22 and July 11, 2007. The sample frame for the surveys was drawn from four major payday lenders and included all borrowers who had obtained loans in the prior three months. The lenders provided names and contact information to a survey firm, which randomly drew 17,940 clients (stratifying by state of residence). The survey firm tried to reach each of these clients by phone to complete a short survey of "opinions and experiences with short-term credit services". Baseline surveys were completed with 6% of the sample frame (7% in Oregon, 5% in Washington), creating a study sample of 1,040 payday borrowers. 873 agreed to be contacted for the follow-up survey, with a small and insignificant difference between Oregon and Washington respondents. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on nearly all of the information collected from the 1,040 respondents to the baseline survey.
B. Sample Characteristics
Respondents report using their payday loan proceeds for bills, emergencies, food/groceries, and other debt service. Only 6% say "shopping or entertainment". Self-reported outside options appear to be thin; when asked "if a payday loan had not been available… what was your second choice to obtain money?", 70% responded with "none" or "don't know". Only 5% replied that a payday lender in another state or online would be their second choice, and only 8% stated "bank"
or "credit union" (although it is not obvious that respondents would think of checking account overdrafts as a source of liquidity). 15% gave more evident potential substitutes (pawn shop, credit card, or car title loan) as their hypothetical 2 nd choice.
the National Conference of State Legislatures at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/banking/paydaylendintro.htm#Bills .
In keeping with the prior studies of payday borrowers summarized in Section II, the households in my sample have low-to-moderate income (nearly 50% report total household income between $20,000 and $50,000). 50% of respondents have educational attainment of a high school degree or less. The mean age is about 47, and over 60% of borrowers are female. Less than 50% are married, and the mean number of dependents is only slightly above one. 19 The remaining variables in Table 1 are outcomes that might be measurably affected by the contraction of payday credit in Oregon, and I discuss them in Section VI below.
V. Identification
In this section I focus on issues related to identifying short-run average effects of the Oregon interest rate cap on household financial condition. I defer discussion of longer-run and heterogeneous and effects until Section VII.
The surveys described in Section IV were designed with a difference-in-differences (DD) estimation strategy in mind for estimating the effects of the Oregon cap on borrowing behavior, employment status, and qualitative assessments of financial well-being (I detail each outcome of interest in Section VI below). There is before-and after-Cap data from Oregon (the "treated" state) and Washington (the "control" state), suggesting that one might obtain unbiased estimates of the Oregon policy change by differencing 5-month changes in the outcomes for Oregon respondents from 5-month changes for Washington respondents. Since the treatment varies at the state level, and I have data from only two states, I simply calculate differences using the state mean for each variable of interest, allowing the variance to differ across states. A DD estimator will produce unbiased estimates of the Cap's average effects under the assumption of no differential trends in the outcomes of interest across Oregon and Washington.
20 Table 1 highlights two potential symptoms of violations of the DD identifying assumption.
One symptom is some observable dissimilarities between Oregon and Washington respondents in the baseline data; baseline differences in observables may indicate proclivities toward differential unobserved trends in the outcomes. Column 3 shows that the Oregon and Washington respondents differ significantly in reported loan purpose, perceived outside options, education, income, marital history, internet access, employment status, and financial outlook. Another symptom is differential attrition across the two states. Columns 4 and 5 (7 and 8) take the 520 baseline respondents in Oregon (Washington) and report survey variables separately for those who completed a follow-up survey (Columns 4 and 7) and those who attrited (Columns 5 and 8).
Column 6 (Column 9) then reports the estimated difference between survivors and attriters for Oregon (Washington). Comparing Columns 6 and 9 suggests that attrition may have been correlated with several outcomes of interest.
I address the potential confounds raised by observable differences and differential attrition by constructing weights designed to balance the sample. I attempt to make the Oregon survivors representative of the Oregon baseline sample by predicting survival (s) among Oregon respondents using baseline characteristics, and then weighting Oregon respondents by 1/s when estimating a DD. This puts more weight on respondents in the follow-up survey who are observably similar to the attriters, and permits valid inference if attrition is not correlated with the treatment and the outcome. 21 I then balance Washington and Oregon respondents by estimating a propensity score p for being an Oregon respondent, using baseline characteristics on all Oregon and surviving Washington respondents, and then weighting Washington respondents by p/(1-p)
when estimating a DD. This weight balances the survivor sample on observable characteristics, thereby maximizing the observable similarity between treatment (Oregon) and control (Washington), and hopefully minimizing the likelihood of differential trends.
VI. Main Results: Five-Month Average Treatment Effects of the Oregon Cap

A. Effects on the use of Payday Loans and Substitutes
Table 2 present estimates of the Cap's effects on the use of payday loans and several potential substitutes. For reference, columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) present baseline and follow-up means for Oregon (Washington) subjects who responded to both surveys. Columns 5-7 present differencein-differences (DD) estimates of the five-month average treatment effects on borrowing. Column 5 estimates the DD without any adjustment for matching or attrition. Column 6 weights to adjust for attrition and other observable differences (as detailed in Section V), dropping observations in the top percentile of weights in each state to reduce the influence of outliers. Column 7 weights without dropping outliers.
The first row shows that the likelihood of recent payday borrowing in Oregon fell by 24 to 29
percentage points relative to Washington, after the Cap. The unweighted likelihood fell from 1 to 0.79 in Washington, and from 1 to 0.51 in Oregon. Subsequent rows explore the degree to which former payday borrowers in Oregon substituted other sources of credit.
21 E.g., say the rate cap restricts access to payday credit in Oregon and thereby worsens financial condition. If survey response is negatively correlated with financial condition, then declines in financial condition will be underrepresented in the survey, and estimates of the treatment effect will be biased upward (downward in absolute value).
I first look at potential alternative sources of liquidity one-by-one. The use of a specific alternative will rise in Oregon relative to Washington if it is a close-enough substitute;
conversely, use of the alternative will fall if it and payday borrowing are complements. There is little evidence of a significant effect on auto title or credit card cash advance borrowing. The baseline prevalence of these products is low in both Oregon and Washington (Columns 1 and 3), and the DDs (Columns 5-7) do not find significant increases from baseline to follow-up in Oregon relative Washington. But the DD confidence intervals are large on these and all other outcomes, so that insignificant results are not precise zeros. The next four rows of Table 2 estimate DDs for increasingly inclusive measures of any recent borrowing (from "loans" only, to loans + checking overdrafts + late bills). Given the reduction in payday credit we expect total borrowing to fall unless alternative sources of liquidity are perfect substitutes. The results on any "loans only" in the last three months again suggest that credit card cash advances and auto title loans are very poor substitutes for payday loans (the DD for any "loan" is about the same as the DD for payday borrowing alone). This meshes with the results on title loans and cash advances individually, and with the baseline assessments of payday loan alternatives (less than 10% of borrowers reported that a title loan or cash advance would be their second choice if they could not get a payday loan).
Checking account overdrafts of various types and/or late bill payment seem to be more likely, but imperfect, substitutes for rationed payday credit. The DDs on these more inclusive measures of borrowing are less than half of the DDs on payday borrowing alone. There several reasons why overdrafts and late bills may be imperfect, and inferior, substitutes for payday loans. Overdrafts are often more expensive than payday loans in pure pecuniary terms: fees are often $25-$35 per transaction (Campbell et al. 2008) . Repeated overdrafts or bounced checks can lead to the loss of checking account privileges (Campbell et al report 6.4 million involuntary closures nationwide in 2005) and criminal charges (Morgan and Strain 2008) . Late bills can also produce substantial costs (late fees, utility shutoffs, reactivation fees, credit score declines).
The last row of Table 2 shows that the proportion of Oregon respondents reporting that it was harder to get a short-term loan recently rose by 18 to 22 percentage points relative to Washington.
So by any measure the survey data shows that overall borrowing has fallen substantially in
Oregon relative to Washington post-Cap.
The welfare implications of these results are unclear, as they hinge on one's underlying model of consumer choice. If consumers are neoclassical (traditionally rational) then of course the Cap reduces welfare for Oregon households by removing an option for which there is no perfect substitute. If consumers are behavioral then reducing access to payday loans (and thereby to liquidity more generally) may prevent overborrowing; hence the credit reductions we see in Table 2 may benefit Oregon households. The data do not permit direct tests of these competing hypotheses and I turn to other outcomes for clues.
B. Effects on Employment, and Qualitative Assessments of Financial Condition
Table 3 presents estimates of the Cap's effects on employment status and qualitative assessments of financial condition. As in Table 2 : Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) present baseline and follow-up means for Oregon (Washington) subjects who responded to both surveys. Columns 5-7 present difference-in-differences (DD) estimates of the five-month average treatment effects. Column 5 estimates the DD without any adjustment for matching or attrition. Column 6 weights to adjust for attrition and other observable differences (as detailed in Section V), dropping observations in the top percentile of weights in each state to reduce the influence of outliers. Column 7 weights without dropping outliers.
Proponents of payday loans argue that even expensive credit can be quite productive if it enables borrowers to avoid missing work (and thereby losing daily wages or their jobs). The loan purpose self-reports are consistent with this story: 31% of borrowers report financing emergency needs like auto repair or medical expenses. Here I look directly at employment status (the survey's measure of income is too coarse to use as an outcome measure). 22 The weighted and unweighted DD point estimates on two measures of unemployment or underemployment are all positive, which is consistent with the hypothesis that reducing payday loan access in Oregon hindered productive investments or consumption smoothing that facilitated job retention (or search). But the estimates here are severely underpowered: given the low baseline prevalence of 22 Karlan and Zinman (2008) find large positive effects of randomized access to 200% APR consumer loans on job retention and income 6-12 months later, in South Africa. unemployment (12%) and the sample size, the effects on unemployment would have to be quite large to be statistically significant.
Next I examine respondents' overall assessments of their financial situation in the past six months, and of their prospects for the future. Using qualitative summary measures of financial condition is attractive given the difficulty of measuring overall (or even financial) well-being, particularly in short surveys. Karlan and Zinman (2008) The DD point estimates on these qualitative assessments suggest that the Cap produced declines in financial condition for Oregon respondents relative to their Washington counterparts.
The proportion of respondents saying their financial situation had been getting worse in the last 6 months increased by 6 to 9 percentage points in Oregon relative to Washington, but the estimates are very imprecise. The proportion saying that they expect their financial situation to get worse in the future increased significantly, by 5 or 6 percentage points, in Oregon relative to Washington.
The last row of Table 3 shows large and significant relative increases in the proportion of Oregon respondents reporting any adverse outcome: being unemployed, assessing recent financial situation as getting worse, or assessing future financial prospects as worse. E.g., the unweighted proportion increased from 0.28 to 0.35 for Oregon respondents, while declining from 0.31 to 0.26 for Washington respondents, for a DD of 12 percentage points (Column 5). The weighted DDs produce similar estimates (13 and 15 percentage points). These magnitudes imply large treatment-on-the-treated effects of access to expensive credit; in keeping with prior impact studies. 23 The quantitative outcomes include job retention and income; and going to bed hungry in the last month. The qualitative outcomes are a "control and outlook" index of self-assessed control over household resources and decisions, optimism, and socio-economic status; and an ordinal measure of changes in food quality over the past year. 
C. Another Outcome: Phone Disconnects
Another outcome that might be of interest is the proportion of phone lines that are disconnected. I do not include this in the summary measure of adverse outcomes because phone disconnects might well be correlated with productive investments (e.g., moves to a better residence, change from landline to cell phone) rather than adverse outcomes like financial distress or eviction.
I estimate a DD for phone disconnects using information from the survey sample frame as well as from the survey sample itself. Among the survey sample frame of 17,940 borrowers called for the baseline survey, 18.6% of Oregon lines and 29.3% of Washington lines were disconnected, for difference of -10.7 percentage points (with a standard error of 0.006). The second difference comes from the follow-up survey sample frame. Everyone who completed a baseline survey had a working phone (since it was a phone survey!) Of the 873 borrowers who agreed to be contacted for the follow-up survey 16.6% of Oregon respondents and 23.8% of Washington respondents had disconnected lines at the time of the follow-up survey, for a difference of -7.3 percentage points (with a standard error of 2.7). The difference between these two differences gives an imprecisely estimated 3.4 percentage point increase (standard error: 2.8)
in Oregon disconnects relative to Washington.
VII. Longer-Run Treatment Effects: Discussion and Exploratory Analysis
The five-month results above suggest that the Oregon cap reduced the supply of credit for payday borrowers, and that the financial condition of borrowers (as measured by employment status and qualitative assessments) suffered as a result. The longer-run impacts of policy initiatives to restrict credit access might differ from the five-month results for at least two reasons.
First, the treatment effects of credit access might have gestation periods. The benefits of productive investments might not be realized for several months or years. The costs of systematically counterproductive loan uses (e.g., negative NPV investments borne of excessive optimism or biased underestimation of borrowing costs, time-inconsistent consumption splurges) might also take time to materialize, particularly if they compound through the channel of serial expensive borrowing and debt traps. The best way to address this issue is to collect outcomes data over longer horizons.
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A second issue is that short-run measures may capture transitional rather than equilibrium outcomes. Borrowers may need time to adjust to the new regime (e.g., to find substitutes that blunt the effects of restricted payday loan access). Lenders may also take time to adjust their supply response. This has been the case in Oregon; as documented in Section III, lenders exited after the effective date of the cap, but payday credit has not completely dried up. Recall that 50%
of Oregon respondents had a payday loan in the follow-up survey. And per the new regulation, these Oregon borrowers were using a product that was cheaper (150% APR) and longer-term (minimum 31 days) than their Washington counterparts. So short-term credit access may have actually improved for some Oregon borrowers. The challenge for interpreting the average treatment effects is that these borrowers are pooled with "already-rationed" former borrowers who can not get a payday loan as a result of the cap. 26 The effects on already-rationed respondents may provide a better indication of longer-term impacts, particularly if payday lenders continue to exit.
I estimate effects on already-rationed respondents by defining new treatment and control groups. I set the treatment group by predicting would-be Oregon payday borrowers in the followup period (i.e., respondents who would have gotten payday loans in the absence of the Cap), 27 and flagging those who did not actually get a loan. There are 76 such predicted already-rationed borrowers. I then estimate DDs for this treatment group using the 157 Washington respondents who were payday borrowers in the follow-up period as the control group. Table 4 Panel A shows DD estimates on the summary borrowing outcomes for the alreadyrationed. Column 5 uses the simple means comparisons, and Columns 6 and 7 weight to adjust for differential attrition and baseline characteristics across treatment and control. As expected, the declines in overall borrowing in Oregon relative to Washington are larger here, among the predicted already-rationed, than in the full sample (compare to Table 2 ). Panel B shows DDs on employment status and the qualitative assessments of financial condition. The results are qualitatively similar to the full sample (compare to Table 3 ) but not precise enough to identify anything but very large differences in effect sizes. 26 Strictly speaking the Oregon borrowers in the follow-up survey may be rationed as well, on the intensive margin and/or on the extensive margin (given that the survey looks back over the prior three months). 27 Specifically, I estimate the likelihood of payday borrowing for Washington respondents in the follow-up survey using baseline characteristics. The I use the coefficients to predict counterfactual (i.e.,. in the absence of the Cap) payday borrowing for Oregon respondents in the follow-up survey, using their baseline characteristics. I define Oregon respondents with a predicted probability of > 0.5 as the would-be borrowers. This produces a would-be borrowing rate of 78% in Oregon, as compared to the actual borrowing rate of 79% in Washington.
VIII. Conclusion
I examine some effects of restricting access to expensive consumer credit on payday loan users, using household survey data collected around the imposition of binding restrictions on loan terms in Oregon but not in Washington. The results suggest that the policy change decreased expensive short-term borrowing in Oregon relative to Washington, with many
Oregon payday borrowers shifting into plausibly inferior substitutes. Oregon respondents were also significantly more likely to experience an adverse change in financial condition.
The results suggest that restricting access to consumer credit hinders productive investment and/or consumption smoothing, at least over the short-term.
Much work remains to address the questions of whether largely unfettered access to expensive credit improves (consumer) welfare, and why.
The likelihood of additional policy changes at the state (and possibly federal) level seems high, suggesting that difference-in-differences (DD) approaches like the one used in this paper will continue to be useful. Future studies would benefit from larger sample sizes and a richer set of proxies for consumer welfare and financial condition. Viable examples of proxies to collect from household surveys include postponed medical care and forced moves as used by Melzer (2007) , shutoffs of heat or other utilities, dunning as used by Morgan and Strain (2008) , and hunger and subjective well-being as used by Karlan and Zinman (2008) .
Future studies would also do well to track outcomes of interest over longer horizons, since the costs and benefits of investment and consumption smoothing activities may have gestation periods, or compound over time.
Finally, it is critical to begin reconciling findings across different studies. Are the differences due to methodology or economic context? Field experiments randomized at the individual level would help, by providing clean variation in credit access and more statistical power than state-level natural experiments. Additional data collection on a richer set of outside options (for borrowing and economic activity) and decision inputs (for intertemporal choice models) would help address whether heterogeneity across consumers and markets drives the results. Sample for each outcome includes only those who responded to the question in both rounds of the survey. Columns 1-5 do not attempt to correct for attrition or for dissimilarity across OR and WA. Columns 6 and 7 weight to correct for attrition and dissimilarity (see Section V of text for details), and Column 6 drops observations in the top 1 percentile of weights.
Weighted
Oregon Washington Difference-in-Differences "Thinking about the future, do you expect your financial situation to:" get worse Columns 6 and 7 weight to correct for attrition and dissimilarity (see Section V of text for details), and Column 6 drops observations in the top 1 percentile of weights.
Oregon
Washington Difference-in-Differences Weighted Sample for each outcome includes only those who responded to the question in both rounds of the survey. Columns 1-5 do not attempt to correct for attrition or for dissimilarity across OR and WA.
Oregon rationed households are those who are predicted to have a payday loan in the follow-up (based on baseline survey characteristics) but who do not actually have one (see Section V of text for details). There are 76 predicted rationed Oregon households in the follow-up survey, and 157 Washington borrowers.
"Thinking about the future, do you expect your financial situation to:" get worse Columns 6 and 7 weight to correct for attrition and dissimilarity (see Section V of text for details), and Column 6 drops observations in the top 1 percentile of weights.
Washington Difference-in-Differences Weighted
